00:33.3
Many of them are just kind of much more loath to use military force.
00:36.5
And then in the middle are what they call the prioritizers, and I'm identified with that group.
00:41.0
I think if you look back at, say, like President Eisenhower and President Nixon,
00:45.0
that's much closer to this kind of prioritizing model.
00:49.1
Yeah, and even as late as the 90s, it's worth remembering that Bob Dole ran in 1996 against President Clinton
00:56.0
against Democrat wars.
00:58.0
So during the Cold War, most of the wars,
01:00.1
it broke out under Democrats, under President Truman, fairly or not.
01:05.0
I mean, it's a kind of partisan point, really.
01:07.0
But bear in mind that under President Truman, for instance, who's now lionized,
01:11.0
he was very unpopular by the end of his administration because the war in Korea had broken out.
01:15.7
It was seen as very unsatisfactory.
01:17.3
A lot of people were killed.
01:18.9
And the defense spending was about 12 to 13 percent, I think, of GDP.
01:22.6
So when President Eisenhower came into office, he was running on cutting the defense budget.
01:28.2
And actually, President Eisenhower's goal,
01:30.0
is to have U.S. troops largely out of Europe within about a decade or so.
01:33.8
You know, we can go back and look at the record.
01:35.5
But, you know, bear in mind, President Eisenhower, you know, he's a mix.
01:37.4
There was some hawkish elements, certainly.
01:38.9
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was quite hawkish.
01:41.7
And part of the Republican constituency was very hawkish.
01:44.9
But President Eisenhower himself, I think, usually landed on a priority.
01:49.8
He was very conscious of constrained resources.
01:52.0
He was very conscious of political will.
01:53.6
Of course, famously, he did not, he chose not to intervene in Indochina in 1954 when the French position collapsed.
02:00.0
So that, and then if you go to President Nixon, you know, President Nixon,
02:05.3
this is something relevant certainly in Southeast Asia, a place like Vietnam,
02:08.2
of course, Vietnam and Philippines, et cetera, was famously the Nixon Doctrine,
02:12.9
which was also very acutely conscious of the matching the resources and political will available to our commitments.
02:19.6
And very similar, in a sense, I think, to what President Trump has been calling for,
02:23.2
which is allies assuming more responsibility, you know, kind of regional sheriff model,
02:30.0
but the Republican Party changed a lot under President Reagan.
02:33.6
President Reagan was very, in some sense, he ran and his background was from the much more sort of rollback wing of the Republican Party,
02:43.9
more aggressive, more existential.
02:47.5
That's where he ran from.
02:49.1
The way he actually governed, and it's complicated because of the role of people like George Shultz,
02:53.5
and also the political environment after Vietnam, he actually did not use the American military very much, right?
02:58.2
I mean, he intervened in Grenada and in Lebanon.
03:00.0
And those were the two examples.
03:02.3
So President Reagan's rhetoric was very aggressive and high,
03:07.1
but his actions, for various reasons, were quite selective.
03:13.0
And it really was a piece of strength.
03:14.3
Then, of course, he famously, and was criticized by the Hawks for this,
03:17.4
engaged with Mikhail Gorbachev to end the Cold War.
03:24.3
And bear in mind that they didn't know the Soviet Union was going to collapse.
03:26.8
The Cold War actually ended probably around 1986, 87.
03:30.0
Even really before the collapse of the Soviet Empire, certainly by 1989.
03:33.8
Soviet Union only collapsed in 1991.
03:35.7
Now, what happened, and I'll get to your question,
03:37.9
is after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
03:40.6
I would say a kind of neo-Reaganite view became dominant in the Republican Party.
03:45.2
And Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan, it's not an accident,
03:47.8
they were two of the biggest advocates,
03:49.0
wrote a famous article in Foreign Affairs that reflected that view.
03:52.8
That came into ascendancy or hegemony within the Republican Party
03:57.0
with the George W. Bush administration,
03:59.1
which was the purest form of maximalist, global liberal hegemony.
04:04.2
Full-spectrum dominance.
04:05.0
Full-spectrum dominance, use of military force unilaterally if necessary.
04:12.0
So when people say, oh, their critics of this view
04:16.2
are trying to overthrow the whole post-World War II order and approach,
04:22.0
What Republican, I think a lot of Republicans, certainly I am opposing,
04:26.5
is the George W. Bush neo-Reaganism.
04:29.1
Which is not even Reagan himself, in fairness.
04:32.2
And that's very important to understand.
04:35.8
Because, look, my view is the last 25 years of American foreign and economic policy
04:41.3
have been a disaster.
04:43.0
And I say this as a Republican,
04:44.5
you have to give Bill Clinton quite a bit of credit.
04:47.0
By the end of the 1990s, the U.S. had a balanced budget.
04:50.9
China was a blip on the horizon militarily.
04:53.9
We were the world's largest economy.
04:56.5
Social cohesion was pretty darn good.
04:59.1
Crime was at historic lows, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
05:02.6
Following 25 years, two massive...
05:04.8
I mean, 9-11, which was not in anybody's control,
05:06.8
but a reaction, trillions of dollars, thousands of people,
05:10.4
or tens of thousands of people wounded, killed in the Middle East wars,
05:15.3
financial crisis, worse since the Great Depression,
05:18.7
social discord, et cetera, et cetera.
05:20.5
And the reaction among Republicans and Democrats
05:25.7
to the opposition to the neo-Reaganite foreign policy comes from that.
05:29.1
And so this gets to the point here is what I'm trying to do
05:32.7
is both at the strategic level but also at the political and fiscal level
05:36.9
is to grapple with the reality of where the trajectory
05:40.0
in not only among Republicans but I think largely among independents and Democrats
05:43.1
which is anti-interventionist, it is akin to a post-Vietnam spirit.
05:47.9
The problem is a lot of these neo-Reaganites just say
05:50.0
we need another Reagan to emerge
05:51.5
and then we'll just be able to solve all of our problems.
05:54.2
But the reality is that we're not where we were in 1980.
05:56.4
Our fiscal situation is far worse.
05:59.1
Our demographics are different and we're facing China
06:01.8
which was far more powerful than the Soviet Union actually was
06:05.3
certainly in economic capacity.
06:07.2
So that's sort of I think the right way to understand
06:09.2
what's going on politically in terms of the foreign policy divide.
06:12.3
Right. I mean, thanks for pointing that out
06:14.5
because I see some continuity between Nixon's approach.
06:17.9
I mean, having a regional gendarmerie,
06:20.0
having a detente with China to isolate the Soviet Union
06:22.8
and then later on Bill Clinton saying something along the lines of
06:26.1
we're not going to be number one forever.
06:28.4
So while we're kind of in the number one position,
06:31.5
let's negotiate a structured future
06:33.7
whereby an American interest could be protected.
06:37.0
My sense is your prioritization approach
06:39.6
is kind of mirroring this interesting overlap
06:42.5
between how Bill Clinton and Nixon,
06:44.7
Richard Nixon understood the future.
06:46.3
I think that's right.
06:47.1
And actually, you know, I have some overlap right now
06:49.7
with the administration on like China policy.
06:52.4
I'm in favor of talking to the Chinese president.
06:54.6
Trump has said he'd be open to talking to Xi Jinping.
06:56.4
I think that's good.
06:57.8
he used to say it's more important to talk to your,
06:59.9
you know, it's most important to talk to your enemies.
07:02.2
There's the ones you need to communicate to.
07:04.0
So just talking to your friends is not doing diplomacy.
07:07.6
Not that I have, unlike all the Democrats,
07:09.6
I have pretty low expectations of what that can achieve.
07:13.3
But I don't, I think that the key thing there is
07:16.3
what is in the best interest of the American people?
07:18.6
So the neo-Reaganite crowd will say,
07:20.4
oh, America is a superpower.
07:21.4
We have to act like a superpower.
07:22.5
And I always go back,
07:24.1
it's not written in the Constitution
07:25.4
or the Declaration of Independence
07:26.4
that we have to be a superpower.
07:27.8
Good to be a superpower, I guess.
07:29.3
But the most important thing is for the American people
07:31.1
to be secure, prosperous, and free.
07:34.8
So, you know, I think that's the thing.
07:37.7
And if we are no longer
07:38.9
the world's number one dominant superpower,
07:42.2
that's not necessarily,
07:43.0
I think America wants to be great,
07:45.7
but that doesn't require dominating everybody else.
07:49.0
And that's the difference between, say, my view
07:50.5
and, say, the John Bolton view is I don't,
07:53.2
I mean, I think you can see
07:54.4
in how I engage in the public and my writing,
07:57.8
I point to the Chinese whenever I have the opportunity.
07:59.4
I'm not trying to humiliate them.
08:00.9
I'm trying not to hold them down.
08:02.9
But then this is basic core American idea,
08:06.0
but also balance.
08:07.0
They're very strong.
08:08.3
And you can't take their amount at their word.
08:10.5
So we have to balance them.
08:11.9
But I'm not in the,
08:12.9
I'm not saying that they can't be also,
08:15.1
you know, successful and rising and so forth.
08:18.4
I mean, if diplomacy is just for friends,
08:20.4
then you don't need diplomacy.
08:22.0
You can, you just.
08:23.2
That's it, right?
08:24.0
That's what diplomacy is.
08:27.5
we talk about your understanding
08:29.4
of U.S.-Philippine relations,
08:31.1
and then we go bigger
08:32.1
with discussing the regional strategy again.
08:37.0
so over the past few weeks,
08:38.6
and I'll back and forth,
08:42.1
I see some interesting convergence
08:45.0
we're talking about very different states,
08:46.7
very different blobs,
08:47.8
very different understanding.
08:49.4
But I see some general understanding
08:52.7
let's just say folks are more tuned in
08:54.5
into world affairs
08:55.3
in terms of the limitations
08:56.7
of American policy,
08:57.8
but also the kind of realism
08:59.2
that you have to have.
09:00.4
But at the same time,
09:01.8
there is some significant difference.
09:03.7
I think there are parts of America
09:05.2
which are very confident
09:06.3
about your position in the world.
09:09.1
probably even in more liberal circles,
09:10.7
there's a lot of self-laceration,
09:12.7
a lot of despondency,
09:16.0
your approach is somewhere in the middle.
09:17.5
Is there also enough of middle America
09:19.6
in a strategic sense,
09:21.2
not only in an electoral political sense,
09:23.3
where the two can come together?
09:25.8
because a lot of American foreign policy,
09:27.3
is going to depend on the presidency.
09:29.5
my political strategy
09:31.3
for the foreign policy
09:35.5
I'm advocating to come into play
09:36.8
is not to convince a majority of senators
09:38.5
because so many of the senators,
09:40.2
including the Republican Party,
09:41.6
and came under the neo-Reaganite
09:44.2
sort of dispensation.
09:45.7
And the reality is that
09:46.9
the only person in the American system
09:48.7
who has ultimate responsibility
09:49.9
for foreign policy is the president.
09:51.3
As Harry Truman said,
09:52.4
the buck stops here.
09:53.8
senators can go on television
09:59.9
but it's a kind of blocking power
10:01.3
or an authorization power
10:03.1
or appropriateness.
10:03.9
It's very indirect.
10:05.4
And I say that with respect,
10:06.9
but the president's the one
10:08.0
ultimately responsible.
10:09.5
I'm not saying that there's going to be
10:10.5
some political movement
10:12.4
a million people on the street
10:13.5
we want a foreign policy
10:14.8
of prioritization.
10:15.6
That's not going to happen
10:16.3
for obvious reasons.
10:17.4
But I think a self,
10:18.8
a rational president
10:20.4
who's thinking about
10:21.2
what's best for the country
10:22.6
and best for his political legacy
10:24.2
or her political legacy,
10:28.0
the neo-Reaganite playbook
10:29.3
because the American people
10:31.3
don't want to cut
10:32.5
and Medicare dramatically.
10:33.6
I can't borrow too much money
10:35.2
because interest rates
10:38.2
and better military,
10:39.5
is in a terrible state
10:40.8
and the defense industrial base
10:42.1
is in terrible shape
10:42.8
and we're not fixing it
10:43.9
with the Ukraine stuff.
10:45.3
If you're on the Hill,
10:46.9
you can say this kind of thing,
10:48.6
but if you're actually
10:49.3
responsible for it
10:50.3
at the National Security Council
10:51.2
or the Defense Department
10:52.2
or the president himself,
10:54.2
then you're going to say,
10:55.3
that's a nice talking point.
10:57.5
back here at reality,
10:58.5
I can't act like that.
11:00.1
And then, of course,
11:00.7
the Chinese and the Russians
11:01.7
are going to look at reality,
11:03.7
at the end of the day.
11:06.2
and then I think politically,
11:07.6
what you could say is,
11:09.4
you could say to the neo-Reaganites,
11:12.4
we can't do what you're saying
11:13.4
and the American people
11:14.2
don't support it.
11:16.3
just to give you,
11:17.3
very illuminating,
11:19.9
the majority of Republican voters
11:21.4
want a smaller U.S.
11:23.5
Half of independents
11:24.8
A majority of Democrats
11:28.6
want a larger American role
11:30.1
But here's the thing,
11:31.5
very important for frontline
11:33.4
a separate poll by Reuters
11:34.7
found that a vast,
11:35.8
or substantial majority
11:37.6
oppose U.S. military,
11:39.8
the use of the military force
11:41.9
any circumstances.
11:43.4
So what Democrats
11:44.5
when they're asked that question
11:45.4
is more development aid,
11:47.0
more engagement with the U.N.,
11:48.3
more international institutions.
11:49.6
They're not thinking
11:50.3
about going to war
11:51.1
with China or Russia,
11:53.8
So that's the political rally.
11:55.4
So you say the neo-Reaganites,
11:56.5
I can't do everything,
11:58.2
we're going to have
11:58.6
an international policy
11:59.9
that's going to be focused on Asia,
12:01.7
that's going to stay in NATO,
12:04.8
to the political base,
12:09.5
we're not going to get
12:10.2
in any stupid wars anymore
12:11.3
if we can possibly avoid it.
12:14.8
I always point out
12:16.0
I was against the Iraq war,
12:17.5
the nation-building mission
12:22.8
et cetera, et cetera.
12:23.6
I've been, you know,
12:30.4
with sharp objects,
12:32.8
we also have to live
12:33.4
in a world where there's,
12:34.8
the Chinese are in
12:35.4
a historic military build-up.
12:36.4
We can't ignore that.
12:38.5
re-industrialize America
12:39.8
and pursue industrial policy
12:42.0
you can't let China
12:43.5
because they're going to
12:44.3
control the world's
12:44.9
largest market area.
12:46.1
So I think that's how,
12:48.8
political strategy
12:52.3
the way the American system
12:55.1
that strategy will work.
12:57.1
I think it's going to be,
12:58.2
we will inevitably
12:59.1
follow it at some point.
13:04.0
some of the bad outcomes.
13:05.0
And that's the acme
13:08.6
doing that right now.
13:10.3
So what you're saying
13:11.3
there's going to be
13:12.0
proactive stewardship
13:13.0
if a good president
13:14.9
and there will be
13:15.5
sufficient deference
13:17.3
perhaps by the rest
13:19.9
stewardship and all,
13:22.8
it's the least bad
13:23.6
equilibrium for them.
13:26.8
that's my optimism.
13:27.6
That's my political
13:28.3
strategy aspiration,
13:30.0
whether it ends up like that.
13:32.5
I think in a very
13:37.9
how we're going to
13:38.4
approach this issue.
13:40.2
what was your experience?
13:44.5
as a senior official
13:45.6
during the Trump administration,
13:46.6
because during this time,
13:48.4
dealing with allies
13:49.2
like the Philippines
13:49.7
was quite tricky,
13:50.7
I would say, right?
13:52.0
like President Duterte
13:55.4
but he caused Obama
13:56.4
questioning the alliance.
13:59.7
and President Duterte
14:00.3
had fantastic rapport,
14:01.6
at least at the personal level.
14:03.5
quite a challenging moment
14:06.0
between the two countries.
14:07.8
understanding of that?
14:11.3
are coming home to roost,
14:12.6
that something was
14:13.3
fundamentally lacking
14:15.9
dealing with some
14:16.4
other crazy dictator?
14:20.5
what was your understanding?
